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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of • • • 1rg1n1a 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record 2140 
C. I. T. CQR.PORATION AND UNIVE SAL CREDIT 
COMPANY, Plaintiffs in Error, Int rpleaders, 
versus 
vV .• T. CROSBY & COMP ANY, INCORPOR TED, Defend-
ant in Error. 
PETITION FOR "WRIT OF ER' OR. 
Your petitioners, C. I. T. Corporation and niversal Credit 
Company, respectfully pray that a writ of e ror be awarded 
them from a final judgment of the Circuit C urt of the City 
of-Norfolk, entered on the 23rd day of Dec[ber, 1938, in a 
certain action therein pending in which W. J. Crosby & Com-
pany, Incorporated, was plaintiff, and 0. . Williams was 
defendant, and C. I. T. Corporation and niversal Credit 
Company were interpleaders, by which jucl ment. waA ren-
dered in favor of the plaintiff against 0. L. illiams in the 
sum of $1,125.50 with interest thereon from J nuary 14, 1936, 
until paid, and costs, and judgment was rend red in favor of 
the plaintiff against the interpleaders. 
THE CASE. 
On the 9th day of July, 1938, W. J. Crosby T Company, In-
corporated, wl10 liereafter will be referred to for convenience 
as the Plaintiff, filed its petition for att chment against 
2(·' one 0. L. Williams, a non-resident. *for n indebtedness 
of $1,125.50. with interest thereon from he 14th day of 
,January, 1936, due upon open account, and n the 19th day 
of July, 1938, the City Ser~eant of the City f Norfolk exe-
cuted the attachment by levying on one Fo d tractor, 1938 
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model, motor No. 18-4273591, also one Nabor trailer, serial 
No. S2067D, license No. Ga. 114-F, and on the 1st day of Au-
gust, 1938, said attachment was served in person on O. L. ·wiJ-
liams, the defendant named in the attachment proceedings. 
Following the attachment of the hereinbefore described auto-
mobile tractor and truck, the C. I. T. Corporation, a corpora-
tion duly organized and chartered under the, laws of the State 
of ·west Virginia, and the Universal Credi~ Company, a cor-
poration duly org·anized and chartered under the laws of the 
State of Delaware, who, for convenience, will hereafter be 
referred to as the Interpleaders, interpleaded alleging that 
they, the Interpleaders, were the holders of conditional sales 
contracts on said motor vehicles, which said contracts were 
duly and legally recorded in the State of Georgia, and t.hat 
by virtue of same, the attachment should not lie or was sub-
sequent to their lien, and said Interpleaders prayed that the 
court determine the respective claims between the Plaintiff, 
W. J. Crosby & Company, Incorporated, and the C. I. T. Cor-
poration and Universal Credit Company. 
As a result of said interpleader, the Circuit Court of the 
City of Norfolk, after hearing· the evidence on the 23rd day 
of December, 19:38, determined that the lien of the attachment 
cteditor had priority over the liens of the interpleaders' con-
ditional sales contracts. Whereupon, the Interpleaders duly 
excepted to the court's ruling, and it is upon the court's 
judgment that the Interpleaders pray for a writ of error and 
su,persedeas. 
3* * A transcript of the record together with the original 
exhibits are herewith presented and prayed to be taken 
as a part of this petition. 
THE FACTS. 
Upon the trial of the case which was heard by the court, the 
jury having been waived, the court certified the facts as fol-
lows: 
'' On ,Tune 27th. 1938, Strickland Motor Company of Cor-
dele, Georgia, sold to 0. L. Williams a certain motor vehicle 
d~sc.ribed as a Ford 134" Truck C. C. Motor No. 4273591-
1938 model. To secure an unpaid balance of the purchase 
price, title ,1ms reserved and the contract of reservation of 
title was on the 28th day of June, 1938, for value, legally 
assigned to the C. I. T. Corporation and was determined bv 
the Court to be duly recorded in accordance with the laws o·f 
Georgia, and on the 9th day of July, 1938, there was and still 
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is due the C. I. T. Corporation a balance on t e purchase price 
in the sum of $839.40. 
'' On Aug11st 23rd, 1937, Strickland Mot r Company of 
Cordele, Georgia, sold to C. E. McElmurr y of Rebecca, 
Georgia, a certain truck and motor vehicle railer described 
as 'Nabor Trailer', serial No. S2067D, and I secure the un-paid balance of the purchase price, title was reserved and for 
value received the said title was assigned ~o the Universal 
Credit Company. The contract of reservation of title was 
duly and properly recorded in the State of a Id in accordance 
with the laws of, Georgia, and on the 1st d y of February, 
1938, the said C. E. McElmurray transferre for value and 
legally his equity in said trailer to the said 0. L. Willi.ams 
of Cordele, Georgia, subject to the reserv d title contract 
aforesaid, and on the 9th day of July, 1938r there was and 
still is due the Universal Credit Company !balance on the 
purchase price in the sum of $47 4.98. 
"These reservations of title and liens w re duly, legally 
and properly recorded in the State of Georgi and in accord-
ance with the laws of the State of Georgia tere valid prior 
liens as against subsequent purchasers and c editors of 0. L. 
vVilliams. The said conditional sales contra, ts and reserva-
tion of title were not recorded in the State of Virginia on 
or before July 9th, 1938, nor have they eve been recorded 
in Virginia. 
•'Prior to July 9th, 1938, 0. L. Williamsi as and still is 
indebted to vV. J. Crosby & Company, Inco porated, a cor-
poration organized under the laws of the S .te of Virginia, 
with principal offices in the State of Norf lk, Virginia, in 
the sum of $1,125.00, with interest thereon fro January 14th, 
1936. 
4* *"In May, 1938, 0. L. ·wmiams operat d certain trucks 
and trailers (not identified as those a ove described) 
from Georgfa to Norfolk, Virginia, more than 4 times, 5 times 
for purposes other than pleasure, to-wit: to transport from 
:K orfolk, Virginia, to Cordele, Georgia, scaf o d products pur-
cl1ased in the City of Norfolk, Virginia, by 1 im; the said 0. 
L. William8 did not make temporary registr tion at the :first 
m"aila.ble registration point after entering t is state at any 
time. 
'•On July 9, 1938, "\V. J. Crosby & Compan , Incorporated, 
of Norfolk, Virginia., sued out an attachme t ag·ainst the 
above described vehicles. which attachment as duly levied 
upon the hereinbefore described vehicle an trailer by the 
City Sergeant of the City of Norfolk." 
In addition to the certificate of facts, ther is also accom-
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panying the transcript of record, by stipulation of counsel. 
the original contracts of conditional bills of sale and assign-
ments, certific.a.tes of recordation, and a memorandum of 
dates. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 
The court erred in having determined that the lien of the 
attaching creditor had priority over the liens of the condi-
tional sales contracts held by the Interpleaders. 
THE ISSUE. 
The issue, which is a narrow one, is as follows: 
Did the Interpleaders, the ho]ders of contracts of reserva-
tion of title to sec.ure the unpaid balance of purchase price, 
which were duly and legally recorded in the- State of Georgia, 
and liens in Georgia having priority over subsequent pur-
cl1asers for value and creditors, take precedence over the 
lien of an attaching creditor in Virginia, the contracts of 
conditional sales and reservation of title not being recorded 
in the State of Virginia T · 
The Plaintiff contends that, the conditional sales contracts 
and reservation of title not having been recorded in the State 
of Virginia, is Yoid as to its lien of attachment acquired 
5• upon the goods of the vendee '*'in the conditional sales 
contract and relies upon Section 5197 of the Code of Vir-
ginia, which is in part as follows : 
"No mortgage, deed of trust, or other encumbrance created 
upon personal property while suc.h property is located in an-
other state shall be a valid encumbrance upon said property 
after it is removed into this State as to purchasers for Yalu-
able consideration without notice and creditors unless and 
until the said mortgage, deed of trust, or other encumbrance 
be recorded according to the laws of this State in the county 
or corporation in which the said property is located in this 
State." 
The Interpleaders contend that their conditional sales con-
tracts and reservation of title having been duly and leg·ally 
recorded in the State of Georgia, take priority over the attach-
ment lien and the fact that thev were not recorded in the State 
of Virginia do not come within the purview of Section 5197 ~ 
sitpm, nor any Virginia Statute. 
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ARGUMENT. 
The facts in the case having been certifie by the Court, 
the argument will necessarily deal with the application of 
the la.w to the facts as found. 
In fact, it is common knowledge that a larg percentage of 
the motor vehicles are µurchased upon condit onal sales con-
tracts, the vendor reserving title to the prop rty as security 
for the unpaid purchase price of same. T ese conditional 
sales contracts, or reservations of title, are invariably as-
signed tog·ethcr with all of the rights of the h Ider thereof to 
:finance companies who purchase same in goo faith and for 
valuP.. and in order to secure their liens the e reservations 
of title are also invariably recorded at t~e pace and in the 
State where the transaction oceurs, and in mo ern times these 
conditional sales contracts and reservati ns of title are 
6* taken upon both *passeng·er cars and tru ks and trailers 
used in interstate transportation for plea ure and inter-
state commerce as well, and the holder of the reservation of 
title looks to the recordation of his conditiona sales contract 
and reservation of title in the place and Sta e in which the 
contract was made and where the property w~s then situated 
as security for the unpaid purchase price. fhis procedure 
was followed in the case at bar, and this pracHce is universal. 
The assignee of the vendor, or the vendor ho ing the reser-
vation of title looks to the place of the making of the contract 
as the situs of the property. 
"Ordinarily, the validity and effect of a c nditional sale, 
as regards both the parties and third person. , are governed 
by the law of the State in which the contract was made and 
where the property was then situated." 11 m. Jr., p. 362. 
'' And the nature, validity and interpretatio of contracts 
are governed by the law of· the place where de, unless the 
contrary appears to be the express intention f the parties." 
See Nelson v. Chesaveake d/ Ohio R. R. Co., BB Va. 971, 14 
S. E. 838, 15 L. R. A. 583; 5 Rul_ing Case Law p. 911. 
This honorable Court in the most recent ase upon this 
subject. C. I. T. Co·rporation v. Guy and others,·· decided 
March 10, 1938, reported in 170 Va. 16, 195 S. E., p. 659, has 
discussed the questions involved in this case t length. The 
distinct.ions between the case cited, supra, a d the case at 
bar, if any, are that in the case of C. I. T. Cor ration. v. G'lty, 
there was an attachment of a passenger car f r a tort, while 
in the case at bar 1here was an attachment o . a motor truck 
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and trailer used for purposes o.ther than pleasure, for a con-
tract debt. In both cases the motor vehicles had reservation 
of title contracts recorded in foreign states and the vehicles 
,-vere owned by persons domiciled in those states and non-
residents of Virginia, and temporarily in this state. In the 
Guy case. this honorable Court said: 
7'* *" Conditional sales of automobiles is a practice widely 
adopted and are often financed by corporations organized 
for that purpose. That, as we have seen, was done in this 
case, and its good faith is not questioned. 
'' In our approach, certain general principles of law, not 
novel but important, are to be remembered. 
"(1) 'Ordinarily, the validity and effect of a conditional 
sale, as regards both the parties and third persons, are gov-
erned by the law of the State: in which the contract was made 
and where the property was then situated.' 11 Am. ,Jr., p. 
362. 
'' (2, 3) 'The problem is complicated when the law of the 
Sfate to which the property is removed requires filing or re-
cording of such contracts as against third parties. When the 
contract of conditional sale does not contemplate removal of 
the property by the vendee, but later the vendee nevertheless 
removes the property to another State, in which the contract 
is not filed or recorded, the rights of the vendor are generally 
determined bv whether or not he has consented to the removal 
of the prope1:ty. Assuming that by the law of the place where 
,a conditional contract of sale is made and where the property 
is then located, the reservation of title in the vendor is valid 
as b(;hveen the parties and effective as against third persons, 
the vendor's title is good and will be enforced, as against 
inuocent purchasers from, or creditors of, the conditional 
vendee, or persons having similar rights, who purchase, or 
levy upon, the property after its removal to another State, 
althoup;h the contract is not recorded or registered in that 
State in accordance with a local statute--not expressly or 
by clear implication applicable to contracts made out of tho 
St.ate, in respect of property subsequently brought into the 
State-at least if the removal of the property is not contem-
plated at the time of the contract is made, and its removal 
i~ without the lmowledp:e or consent of the vendor.' 11 Am. 
Jr., p. 364, Am. Law Inst. Restatement, Conflict of Laws, 
§275. 
"(4) The nature. validity, and interpretation of contracts 
are governed by the law of the place where made, unless the 
contrary appears to be the express intention of the parties. 
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'' ( 5) State statutes ex pro_prio vi_qore ope a,te only within 
the limits of their several states. 
• " 'Statutes derive their force from the a thority of the 
Legislature, and as a necessary consequ'ence !heir effect will 
be limited to the boundaries of the State.' Sutherland 011 
Stat. Constr. ~218; Richmond Standard St el, etc., Co. v. 
Dininny, 105 Va. 439, 53 S. E. 961. 
"(6) Frequently, however, by courtesy or omity, they are 
given effect in foreign jurisdiction when the clo not contra~ 
vene public policy, are not immoral, and vio ate no positive 
law of the forum. Nelson. v. Chesapeake ct O R. Co.~ 88 Va. 
971. 14 S. E. 838, 15 L. R. A. 583; 5 R. C L., p. 911. 
8*' *"In McComb v. Donald's Adni'r., 82 a. 903, 5 S. E .. 
558, it was held that a subvendee from a rchaser under 
a conditional sales contract could acquire no ig·hts superior 
thereto although without notice of it, and in Cr i,q v. 1Villianis, 
90 Va. 500, 18 S. E. 899, 44 Am. St. Rep. 934, · was held that 
a chattel mortgage executed in another Stat , located there 
and duly recorded, need not be recorded in irginia upon a 
removal of property to this state, and that, under comity, 
the lien of this foreign chattel mortgage co Id be enforced 
here. 
'• If plaintiff below is to prevail, it must be ecause of some 
present Virginia statute. 
· "Very much in point is the case of Osmon Barrin,qer Co. 
v. E1,a A. Hey, from the law and equity cour of the city of 
Richmo~d, 7 Va. Law Reg., N. S., 175. G. C. hort on l\fai:ch 
15. 1920, purchased from the Osmond-Barring r Company of 
-Charlotte, N. C., an Essex touring car unde a conditional 
sales contract. A down payment was made nd notes exe-
cuted for the balance of the purchase money. This contract 
was duly recorded at Charlotte. Short the brought the 
car to Richmond and sold it to Hey, a reside t of that city. 
Defame proceedings were instituted by the endor. There 
the plaintiff prevailed. 
'' J"udg·e Crump, after discussing· the law lai down in 1J1 c-
C omb v. Donald's Adm.'r., sitpra, and in Ora v. 1Villiams, 
supra, analyzes the provisions of our statutes ~ ritten into the 
Code of 1919 as sections 5189 and 5197. S tion 5189, as 
amended by Acts 1923, Ex. Sess., c. 159, is in p rt as follows: 
'' 'Every sale, or contract for the sale of g ods and chat-
tels. wherein the title thereto, or a lien there n, is reserved 
until the same be paid for, in whole or i part, or the 
trm1sfer of title is made to depend on any co dition, where 
possession is delivered to the vendee, shall, in espect to such 
reservation and condition be void as to credit rs of the ven-
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dee who acquire a lien upon the goods and as to purchasers 
from the vendee, for value, without notice, from such vendee' 
unless duly executed and recorded in Virginia. 
"It was held that this section applied to intrastate move-
ments of property only and did not cover conditional sales 
contracts which need not be recorded in Virginia, if duly 
recorded elsewhere. Obviously it could not be made to apply 
to cars in transit. 
'' Section 5197 was enacted to meet the ruling in Craig v. 
Williams, supra. It reads: 
'· 'No mort~:age, deed of trust, or other encumbrance 
created upon personal property while such property is lo-
eated in another State shall be a valid encumbrance upon 
said property after it is removed into this State as to pur-
chasers for valuable consideration without notice and cred-
itors unless and until the said mortg·age, deed of trust, or 
other encumbrance be recorded according to the laws of this 
State in the county or corporation in which the said prop-
erty is located in this State.' 
9* ff.-" (7) Judge Crump was of opinion that a conditional 
sale was not an encumbrance and so did not fall under 
the ban of the statute. Chattel mortgages are encumbrances 
and to cover them is one of the reasons for its enactment. 
'' It is perfectly true that this decision of Judge Crump 
is not controlling authority, but it is the considered opinion 
of a great judge, who afterwards became president of our 
Special Court of Appeals. 
"(8) The distinction betwoen chattel mortgages and con-
ditional sales is pointed out in our own cleeisions. In .Ex-
1,,Jsition Arcade Corp. V'. Lit Bros., 113 Va. 574, 75 S. E. 117, 
Ann. Cas. 1913D, 335, it was said that retention of title was 
but a chat.tel mortgag·c in short form. .Judge Chichester, 
howP.ver, in Vfr_qinia Fire d; Marine Ins. Co. v. Lennon, 140 
Va. 766, 125 S. E. 801, 38 A. L. R. 186, pointed out that this 
waR uot necei:;sarily true as to third parties. One who owns 
a chattel covered by a mortgage is its solo and unconditional 
'owner, hut where title i:;; retained, he has in it only a bene-
ficial or equitable interest. Only this interest can be seques-
trated in attachment proceedings: unless there is failure to 
comply with some re~:istration or recordation statute. Seward 
& 'Co. v. Miller &l Higdon, 106 Va. 309, 55 S. E. 68L 
''Unless recordation is required by our 'Virginia statute, 
it is unnecessary even as against creditors or purchasers. 11 
C. J., p. 510. We have seen that it was not. 
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"(9) Moreover, Zaglin 's automobile was 
Virg·inia. 
'' The Supreme Court of North Carolina 
consider this particular statute (Applewhite 
210 N. C. 433, 187, S. E. 588, 590) and said: 
t 'removed' to 
ad occasion to 
o. v. Etheridge, 
" 'It should be noted that the statute und r. consideration 
refers to encumbrances on property "after ·t is removed'' 
into the state of Virg·inia, which would indi _ate that it was 
not intended to include encumbrances on prorlerty which was 
only trnnsitorily or temporarily in the state. The word "re-
moved'', as used, implies not only the tnking f the property 
into Virginia, but also the allowing of the p operty to come 
to rest therein-the gaining a situs therein.' W. H. Apple-
11;hite Co., Inc. v. EthC'ridge, 210 N. C. 433, 187 . E. 588. Hare 
cf; Chase v. Tonikinson, N. J. Sup., 129 A. 3 6; For.qan v. 
Smedal_. 203 vYis. 564, 234 N. W. 896." 
10... *In the case of Forpan v. 8111,edal, 23 N. W. 896, de-
cided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsi , February 10, 
l.931, the court used this language : 
The vital question for determination on thi appeal, under 
th~ circumstances Rhown by tl1e stipulated f cts herein, is: 
·was the automobile "removed" from the state of Illinois to 
the state of ·wisconsin within the meaning o~ the following 
lan~uage of section 122.14, to-wit:· "When, prior to the per-
formance of the condition, the goods * * * ar~ removed from 
another state into a filing district of this state''. . 
w·hen mav it fairlv be said that an automo ile is removed 
from another state into this state so as to r quire_ the filing 
of a conditional sales contract to which it is subject? Does 
the mere brnging, of a car into this state for emporary pur-
poses, such as a Yisit or vacation, amount to removal under 
our statute, even thou~h such visit or vacati n is prolonged 
with the knowledire of a conditional sales eller for more 
than ten days? Does not the lang·uage '' re oval from an-
other state into the filing district of this stat '' rathe.1· mean 
or apply to a removal w11ich is not tempor ry or for tem-
porary purposes such as a visit or a vacat on? Does not 
this language, when applied to an automob le which chief 
characteristic is movability and which exists or the one pur-
pose of transportation between places more or le~s distant 
fr()m ea~h other, clearly mean that the auto, in order to be 
con~.idered ''removed'' under this statute, m st be taken to 
another state with an intention on the part f its owner to 
change more or less the permanent situs of he car? 
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(1) We conclude that the word "removed", as found in 
the statute, ,means something more than a mere temporary 
removal or change of location for temporary purposes. To 
hold otherwise would give rise to great injustice and would 
lead to a situation which would, to say the least, render a 
conditional sale contract an exceedingly hazardous transac-
tion from the viewpoint of the .seller who advances a large 
part of the purchase price and who makes the purchase by 
the buyer possible. Automobiles are purchased for the pur-
pose of transportation, and every one knows that they are 
often used for making trips from one state to another for tem-
porary visits or purposes. To hold that an automobile so 
employed is ''removed'' from one state to another within 
the meaning of the ConcliJional Sales Act, so as to require the 
seller, after receiving notice, to file his contra,ct, or a copy 
thereof, in the filing· district where the car may be temporarily 
located, is to write into the act something that seems ne.ver 
to have been intended. 
'' A similar question arose in a case also decided by the 
Supreme Court of New ,Jersey. Hare db Chase v. Tomkinson, 
129 A. 396. In that case a truck had been purchased by one 
'I1omkinson from the Mack Corporation. Tomkinson lived in 
New Jersey, but his place of business was in the city of Phila-
delphia. His bm,iness was the transportation of goods be-
tween Philadelphia and Atlantic City. The truck was 
ll."1.: ordinarily kept in «.Philadelphia when not in use at At-
lantic City. The truck, according to the terms of the 
contract, was leased or loaned to Tomkinson. The truck was 
seized on -an execution issued out of a New Jersey court. It 
w·as contended that the truc-k had been removed from Phila-
delphia into a New ,Jersey district, and that, under section 
14 of the 1Conditional SaleR Act, the Reller had failed to :file a 
copy of the contract within ten days after it had been re-
moved to a district in New Jersey. In that case.it was stated, 
page 397 of 129 A. : . 
'· 'The contract between the Mack Corporation and Tom-
kinson was made in Philadelphia. The situs of the truck was 
Philadelpllia. The word ''removal'' in the New Jersey stat-
utn does not mean a mere bringfog of the truck within the ter-
ritorial limits of New Jersey. If this were the law, then no 
seller who had sold in some other state an automobile upon 
the installment plan, with reservation of title, could have his 
rights protected under the agreement by which the automo-
bile was sold against a New Jersey creditor, if the automo-
bile was brought within the state of New Jersey. As most 
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automobiles are sold upon the. installment be 
rendily seen to what such a construction of he act of 1919 
would lead. This was not the intention of t e Legislature. 
It sc•erns to mo that by fixing the situs of the truck in Penn-
sylvania, as was done by the agreement, a r moval to New 
Jersey, within the meaning of the statute, co ld only be ac-
complished by the buyer forming, first, an int nt in his mind 
to remove the truck to New Jersey; and, sec ndly, actually 
removing the truck to some place in New J e sey which the 
buyer fixes as the New Jersey situs . of the tr ck. It is like 
a chang·e of domicile. A change .of domicile an only be ac-
complished by a person intending, first, -to ch nge his domi-
cile, and secondly, actually changing it. The o things must 
coneur. They must be present, namely, the intention and 
the actual change .. * "" * 
'' 'There is nothing in the evidence in th present case 
which indicates that Tomkinson had any inte1 .ion of remov-
ing the situs of the tr1,1ck to New Jersey. The ere fact that 
it was used in New Jersey in the manner it -as, or bore a 
New J'ersey license tag was no evidence of a emoval within 
the meaning of the statute as above defined. It was necessary 
for the judgment creditor to prove the chang·e o situs. There 
was no evidence of it. Therefore, the truck ;vas protected 
under the agreement made in Pennsylvania which gave a 
Pennsylvania situs to the truck.' " 
The foregoing case was quoted with approval in the Forga,'11, 
v. Srnedal case, supra. . 
The law of the Tomkinson Case was approve{[ by the Court 
of Appeals of New Jersey without diss~nt in F;ndler v. Com-
mcr<:ial Credit Corp. (1929), 105 N. J. Law, 4 4, 144 A. 582. 
In di~cussing the question as to what constitute a "removal" 
within the meaning of. section 14 of the Co itional Sales 
Act, the court said : 
12* *'' This question is clearly and defini ly settled in 
an opinion by Justice Katzenbach, in the case of Hare 
d'; Chase v. Tomkinso'l'I,." 
A rather illuminating discussion as to the eaning of the 
word d' removal", as found in section 14 of t e Conditional 
Sales Act, relating to removal of goods from ne filing dis-
trict to another :filin~· distrie.t within .the same tate, is found 
In Re Bowman (D. C.). 28 F. (2d). 620, 622. In discussing 
section 71. 73 and 74 of the Personal Propert... Law of New 
York (being sections. 11, 13 and 14 of the U "form Condi-
tional Sales Act), the court said: 
12 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
"It will be seen that the removal contemplated by sections 
73 and 7 4 is not a temporary and transitory removal. There 
is the idea of permanence and continuance in new location 
about the word 'removal' as used in these two sections, else 
why the provision in section 74 that the three years' refiling 
rule of section 71 shall apply to the filing district to which 
the articles are removed as well as to the filing district in 
which the contract was originally filed f These two sections, 
taken together, are evidently intended to cover permanent 
removal from one filing district to another. The buyer is to 
give the seller ten days' notice of the district to which the 
removal is to be made and the time of the intended removal. 
The seller must then file a copy of the instrument of the new 
filing district within ten days after the receipt of such no-
tice, so that the filing in the new district will concur with or 
anticipate the time of the arrival of the chattels in the new 
di~trict. There h:; thus no opportunitv for anv time to inter-
vene between the time of the arrival of the vchattels in the 
new district and the time of the filing of a copy of the con-
ditional copy of sale in the new district. 
'' Surely this more or less elaborate machinery cannot be 
intended for any temporary, transitory ,change of location, 
and is evidently intended only for permanent and continuous 
chauge. '' 
']~here is other language throughout the opinion to the 
effect that the word "removal" as contained in s<1ction 14 of 
the act relates to ''a permanent and continuous removal" 
rather than a temporary one. 
The court in the For.qan v. Sniedal case, supra, after citing 
the foregoing, says: 
"We have found no decisions holding to the contrary." 
In tl1P. case of General Motors Acceptamce Corporation v. 
Schwartz, decided by the Supreme Court of New J.ersey 
13* on March 17, 1937, 190 Atl., pp. 625-627, *which decision 
was later confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of N" ew Jersey, 194 Atl., p. 183, the court said:· 
":Moreover, we believe there was no removal within the 
intendment of section 14 of the New Jersey Conditional Sales 
Act. The word 'removal' in the New .jersey statute does 
not mean a mere bringing of the car ( where situs was fixed 
in New York as was done by the contract) within the terri-
torial limits of New Jersey. A removal to New Jersey, within 
C. I. T. Corporation, et al., v. W. J. Oro by & Co. 13 
the meaning of the statute, could only be acco plished by the 
buyer forming, first an intent to remove the ar to New J er-
sey, and secondly, actually removing the ca to some place 
in New Jersey which the buyer fixes as the N w ~T ersey situs 
of the car.'' 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey citing· wi approval the 
cases of Hare db 'Chase, Inc. v. Tomkin.son, sit ra, and Endler 
v. Ccmnnercial Credit Corp., 105 N. J. Law, 4, 4, 144 A. 582. 
F,urther examination of the language of Section 5197 re-
veals that. the Legislature had no idea or intention of it ap-
plying to motor vehicles for this reason. The statute says in 
part as follows : 
'' ;'{, * * until the said mortgage, deed of tru t, or other en-
cumbrance be recorded according to the law of this State 
in the eounty or corporation in which the said propertu -i." lo-
cated in this State." (Italics ours.) 
As to the recording of liens and conditional sales contracts 
on automobiles, the Legislature of Virginia has expressly 
pro,·ided the method for recording same in Se tion 2154 (64) 
and in said section the following language wirl be found: 
"Said certificate of, title when issued bv the division show-
inp; a lien 01' encumbrance shall be deemed dequate notice 
to the Commomvealth, creditors and purchas rs that a lien 
against the motor vehiele exists and the rec rding· of such 
re.c:en)ation o.f title, lien or encwnibrance in th . county or city 
w1wrein the pitrchaser or debtor resides or e sewhere is not 
nece.c;.~ary and shall not be reqiifred. '' 
So it will be readily seen that the language · n section 5197 
'' «, * * be recorded accordin_q to the laws f this State in 
the coitnfJJ or corporation in which the said roperty is lo-
cated in this State.'' 
14* ~~could not be by any mtendment of the Legislature to 
apply to a motor vehicle, as the record tion of a. lien 
or rr.Rervation of titlP. on a motor vehicle e n when titled 
and licensed in the State of Virginia is not eqnirecl to be 
rP.corded in the county or corporation in whic 1 the property 
i'; located, but the lien or encumbrance or rese vation of title 
is shown upon the certificate of title. A read· g of this por-
tion of the section in connection with tlrn wo d ''removed'' 
would imply that the Legislature was referri g- to personal 
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property other than motor vehicles which had been per-
m.auently removed into the State from another State and its 
situs fixed. 
The Legislature in Section 5197 of the Code must have had 
in mind and intended to protect the purchasers for valuable 
com~ideration without notice of personal property which the 
purchaser could assume from possession belonged to the pos-
sessor thereof, unless at its location there .was duly recorded 
against it a mortgage, deed of tmst or other encumbrance and 
to µrotect creditors of the possessor thereof under like cir-
cumstances. It is hard to conceive that the Leg·islature in-
iended that a resident creditor who had not in any wav based 
the credit given to the debtor upon a motor vehicle~ should 
I1ave a lien against same prior and superior to a non-resident 
who retained title to secure it for the deferred payment of the 
pm chase price. Logic does not present any reason why a 
resident crP.ditor should under such circumstances take pri-
ority over the non-resident. The question presents itself, 
why should the creditor of a non-resident debtor who· has 
not in any way been led to give the credit based upon the 
po~session of the motor vehicle by the non-resident have a 
prior lien? "What reason would there be for the Legislature 
to grant to the creditor any such lien? What reason would 
there be for the Legislature to provide for any subject 
15* for attachment? The only *logical answer is that there 
could be none. It may have been argued with some 
snccess (although it is very doubtful in the case ·where the 
title itself was reserved in a non-resident state) that the Leg-
islature intended to protect a purchaser of a motor vehicle in 
the possession of another, but it is hard to conceive in this 
day and time of any one being a purchaser for value without 
ndicc because the laws of all of the states require, in order to 
pnss tit]e to a motor vehicle, that same be by a certificate of 
.title duly issued by the State wherein the motor vehicle is 
originally sold, and transfer of title is required to be made 
upon the original certificate of title, or a certificate of title 
throug·h the State Department, but by no line of reasoning can 
it be thoug·ht that the Legislature intended to grant a lien to 
atfaching creditors upon motor vehicles temporarily in the 
State which certainlv could not have been the basis of credit. 
Certainly in the caswe at bar where the debt had existed be-
tween tlie debtor and the creditor prior to the purchase of the 
truck and trailer by the debtor, there could have been no 
credit given by virtue of the ownership or the ownership of 
equity in the truck and trailer in question which was held by 
the judgment creditor. 
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In the .Annotation of Section 5197, chapter 10 of the Code, 
found at page 1739, will be found as follows 
"This section requiring that 'no mortg·ag deed of trust, 
or other encumbrance' upon property in an ther state shall 
be valid as to subsequent purchasere. in v·1·ginia upon re-
mc,val of property herein unless recorded, d es not embrace 
a foreign. conditional con.tract of sale." 
And the Annotation refers to the note unc r Section 5189 
of the Code which will be found on page 172 · , entitled '' Re-
moval of Property-Conflict of Laws'' : 
16~ *''This section requiring the record tion of condi-
tional sales agreement, does not apply o property re-
·moved into this State where validlv record d in the State 
where situated. This statute was enacted to pr tect purchasers 
in intrastate movemen. ts of property and not t.i terstate move-
ments of property. Under comity between s ates the condi-
ti,Jnal ~ale agreement, valid in a foreign st te, will be en-
forcP.d here. Osmond-Barringer Co. v. Hey, Va. Law Reg. 
N. S. 175." 
In the case of Rudolph v. Fanners Supply o., 131 Va. 305-
314. 108 S. E. 638, the court held: 
"There is nothing in this section (refer ·ng to Section 
5189 of tl1e Code of Virginia) to indicate tl at the Heneral 
AsBembly, when it gave the lien which the ection affords, 
inte11ded to place upon the vendor the duty o foil owing the 
subsequent course of the chattel sold by him, and, failing in 
this duty, incur the penalty of losing his lien i the event that 
in the ultimate, such chattel, without his know ,edge, became a 
part of a shifting stock, and was sold to an inno ent purchaser. 
It would be unreasonable to place such an i:Qte retation upon 
the statute." 
It is the earnest contention of the petitione .s that it would 
bt~ unreasonable to say to them, after they d seen to the 
due and proper recordation of the conditiona • sales contract 
in Georgia, that they had the duty of following· the subsequent 
course of the motor vehicle and failing in this duty incur the 
penalty of losing their lien. 
It is respectfully submitted that at the m st a8 between 
the Internleaders and third parties, the ven ee had in the 
truck and trailer only a beneficial or equitab interest, and 
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at the very most tllis interest was all that could be seques-
trated in the attachment proceedings. 
There are decisions without end upon this subject, but 
aciliering as close as possible to the desires of this Court, 
only those which seem pertinent to the questions at issue 
are cited. · 
I:µ conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that the condi-
tional sales contracts, having· been duly and legally re-
17'~ corded in the State of Georgia, are *superior liens to 
that of the attaching· creditor; there was no duty upo11 
the Interpleaders to follow the motor vehicles or the vendee 
into 1.be State of Virginia and see to the recording of their 
liens in Virginia. Section 5197 of the Code of Virginia does 
not apply to conditional sales contracts upon motor vehicles 
and it was not the intention of the Legislature that an attach-
ing creditor should have priority over the valid Georgia liens 
and the court erred in so holding. 
Judge Spindle in his opinion, page 16-a of the record, says: 
''I think the case of C. I. T. C<>rp. v. Guy, decided by our 
·Court of Appeals, March 10, 1938, has settled the question 
that a conditional sales contract properly recorded under the 
laws of another state is good in Virginia, but that case clearly 
indicates that if the registration of a foreign motor vehicle 
is rPquired under the Motor Vehicle Code of Virginia, then 
the liens on such vehicle are required to he recorded in Vir-
ginia. See also section 17 of the M. V. Code. I think the 
evidence shows that the defendant 0. L. Williams had regu-
larly operatP.d his motor vehicle in Virgfoia as defined '"by 
that code (Section 23). that is by operating more than four 
times in the month of :May, 1938, for purposes other than 
purposes of pleasure, and by failing to make temporary reg-
istmt.ion at the, first available registration point after enter-
ing this state on his third trip in the month of July, 1938." 
It is respectfully submitted that the court erred in this 
construction of the decision of C. I. .T. Corvoratfon. v. Gity, and 
also in Motor Vehicle Code of Virginia, the section of the 
Motor Vehicle Code of Virginia requiring registration in cer-
tain instances was intended as a police regulation for the 
puq)ose of collecting· revenue from the owner of the motor 
vehicles operated other than for pleasure within the state 
more than· threo times in anv one month. Certainlv if the 
Legislature had intended to require the recordation offoreign 
liens, it would have specifically said so. Certainly by no in-
tendment could the Legislature have intended that _the holder 
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of a conditional sales contract was to follo the conditional 
sales vendee as to other vehicles which he ight operate in 
the State of Virginia, and if forsooth he oper ted other motor 
vehicles in Virginia, the holder of the fnditional sales 
18* contract would lose its lien. It is •Ji:not reasonable, and 
this case itself is a good example, to s ow that it was 
not the intention of the Legislature because t e truck in ques-
tion was not purchased bv the conditional s les vendee until 
.J uue 27, 1938, whereas it"' was attached on J 1ly 9, 1938, less 
than thirty days after it was purchased, a d the evidence 
does not show that this truck, or any other ruck owned by 
the conditional sales vendee, was in the Stat~ of Virg·inia ex-
cept twice between the date of the purchase nd the date of 
the attachment, and as will be noted from th court's finding· 
of fact. there was no evidence that the true and trailer in 
question had either ever been in the State of Virg-inia before 
the date of attachment, notwithstanding· the fact that the 
evidence does show that some unidentified tr1 ks and trailers 
belonging· to the conditional sales vendee w re in the City 
of Norfolk, Virginia, for the purpose of load ng and hauling 
seafood in the month of May more than fo r times. It is· 
inconceivable that the Leg·islature intend~d under such cir-
cumstances that the holder of conditional sales contracts 
would lose its lien bv virtue of this act. 
A eareful reading of the record will disclo e to the Court 
that the P.rror complained of has been commi ted by the trial 
court and that the judgment should be set as de and a judg-
ment entered for thP. Interpleaders to the e ect that their 
liens having· been duly recorded in the State f Georgia, are 
sur,erior and paramount to the claims of the ttaching credi-
tor, and that the vendee only had a beneficial or equitable in-
terest in said truck or trailer, subject to att hment, if any, 
and because of this and other errors which ar apparent upon 
the face of the pleadings and manifest to the c urt from an in-
spection of the record, your petitioners pra. for a writ of 
error and snpersedeas to the judgment herein entioned, and 
that same may be r~viewed by your honorable Court, and the 
judg1nent of the trial court set aside and judg ent be entered 
for the Interpleaders, your petitioners, est blishing their 
priority and proper legal rig·hts in the mat er. And your 
petitioners will ever pray, etc. 
The rig-ht to be heard orally in favor of gr - ting; this peti-
tion is asked. A copy of this petition was ha ded to counsel 
for the plaintiff on the 15th day of Feb uary, 1939. 
19• ·This petition is adopted as plaintiff i error's open-
ing brief. 
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This petition is to be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court of Appeals at Richmond. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. I. T. CORPORATION AND UNIVER-
SAL CREDIT. COMP ANY, 
By VIVIAN L. PAGE; Counsel. 
I, Vivian L. Page, attorney at law, practicing in the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby certify that 
in my opinion the judgment and verdict complained of in the 
foregoing petition should be reviewed by the Supreme Court 
o.f Appeals of Virginia. 
Given under my hand this 16th day of February, 1939. 
VIVIAN L. PAGE. 
Copy of this petition has been this day delivered to me. 
Feby. 15, 1939. 
W. J. CROSBY & COMP ANY, 
INCORPORATED, 
By H. B. COX, Counsel. 
Received Febr·uary 18, 1939. 
M:. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
Writ of error and su,persedeas g·ranted. Bond $2,000. 
Murch 24, 1939. 
JOHN W. EGGLESTON. 
Received March 25, 193R 
M. B. W. 
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RECORD 
VIRGINIA.: 
Pleas beforP. the Circuit Court of the C ty of Norfolk, 
at the Courthouse thereof, on the 23rd day f December, in 
the year, 1938. 
Be It Remembered, That heretofore, to-wi : In the Cir-
cuit Court aforP.said, on the 9th day of ,July, i the year, 1938, 
came the plaintiff W. J. Crosby & Company Incorporated, 
and filed its petition for attachment against the defendant, 
0. L. "\Villiams in the following words and ures: 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the City of 
W .. T. Crosby ~ Company, Incorporated, Pla· tiff 
v. 
0. L. "'\Villiams, DP.fendant 
PETITION FOR .ATTA.OHME 
Judge of the Circuit Court of the City of N rfolk: 
·Your petitioner, W .. T. Crosby & Company Incorporated, 
a corporatio~, .respectful~y represents t~~t: I 
l. 0. L. Williams. tradmg· as Cordele Fish nd Oyster Co., 
is indebted to your petitioner in the sum of Eleven 
page 2 ~ Hundred Twenty-five & 50/100 ($1, 5.50) Dollars, 
with interest thereon from Januar. 14, 1936, till 
paid, at the rate of six per eentum per annum, for g·oods sold 
and delivered by your petitioner to the said . L. Williams, 
at his instance and request, as shown bv the ccount hereto 
attached. - · 
2. The said 0. L. "'\¥illiam~. iR not a residen of this State, 
E·nd l1e ha8 estate or debts owing· to him wit in the City of 
Nrrfo1k. Va.; and 
3. The said 0. L. Williams intends to remo e or is remov-
ing or lrns removed his own estate, or the p oceeds of the 
sale of his property or a material part of sue estate or pro-
ceeds. out of this State so that there will p obably not be 
therein effects of such debtor sufficient to sa isfy the claii:n 
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of your petitioner when judgment is obtained therefor, should 
only the ordinary process of law be used to obtain the judg-
ment. 
4. Your petitioner is entitled to recover at the least, the 
sum of $1,125.50, with interest as above set forth, and costs. 
Therefore, your petitioner respectfully asks for an attach-
ment against the estate, real and personal, of the said 0. L. 
W'"illiams, returnable on August 1st, 1938; and the said 0. 
L .. Williams is made principal defendant to this petition. 
L.B. COX, 
W. J. CROSBY & COMP ANY, INC., 
By A. L. BONvVELL, 
Secy. and Tr~as. 
Attorney for Petitioner. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary 
page 3 ~ Public in and for the City of Norfolk, Va., by A. L. 
Bonwell, who also made oath that he is agent for 
the said W. J. Crosby & Company, Inc., this 9th day of July, 
1.938. 
CHRISTINE EV ANS, 
Notary Public. 
My Commission expires Jan. 23, 1942 . 
. rhe following is the exhibit attached to the foregoing pe-
tition: 
W .• J. Crosby & Co., Inc., 
Wholesale Oyster Packers and Planters 
and 
Established 1872 
~-,resh and Frozen Fish 
Shippers. 
Norfolk, Va. July 9, 1938 
0. L. WILLIAMS, Trading as 
Cordele Fish & Oyster Company, 
Cordele, Ga. 
Terms : Weekly Settlements 
C. I. T. Corporation, et al., v .. W. J. Cr sby & Co. 21 
1935 To account rendered 
Dec. 3 Oysters 





















The following is the process issued on th foregoing peti-
tion on the 9th day of July, 1938: 
Commonwealth of Virginia; 
To tl1e Sergeant of the City of Norfolk, Gre ting: 
·whereas, W. J. Crosby & Company, Inc., taintiff has this 
dav filed in the Clerk ts Office of our Circ it Court of the 
City of Norfolk, a petition duly sworn to, raying for the 
issuance .of an attachment ag·ainst 0. L. Wllliams principal 
defendant upon the grounds set out in said p tition; 
The ref ore, We Command You in the na c of the Com-
monwealth of Virginia that you attach so uch of the land 
tenements, goods, chatt~ls, money and effect of the said de-
fendant, not exempt from execution, as wil be sufficient to 
satisfy the demand of the plaintiff, as clai ed in said peti-
tion, to-wit: for the sum of Eleven hundred twenty-five dol-
lars and fifty cents ($1,125.50): with legal ·nterest thereon 
from the 14th day of J"anuary, i936, till pai , and the costs-; 
and if any tangible personal property be aken possession 
of by you hereunder, you shall safely keep e same in your 
possession to satisfy any judgment that m y be recovered 
by the plaintiff in this proceeding. 
We Further Command you in he name of the 
page 5 } Commonwealth of Virginia that yr,u .summon the 
said defendant 0. L. Williams if h be found within 
your city, or in any city or county wher~i you may have 
seized property under and by virtue hereof, o appear before 
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our Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, at the Courthouse 
thereof, on the 1st day of August, 1938, and answer said peti-. 
tion or state the grounds of defense thereto. 
And then and there make known how you shall have exe-
cuted this writ. 
,vitness, Cecil M. Robertson, Clerk of our said Court, at 
his office this 9th. day of July, 1938, in the 163rcl year of the 
Commonwealth. 
Teste: 
CECIL l\f. ROBERTSON, Clerk. 
L. B. cox; p. q. -
I, Cecil M. Robertson, Clerk of the Circuit Court of the 
City of Norfolk, do hereby certify that borid in the penalty 
of three thousand ($3,000.00) dollars, has been duly executed 
on behalf of the plaintiff, with A. L. Bonwell, as principal 
thereon, and J. P. Hopkins, who justified his sufficiency un-
der oath, as surety thereon, conditioned according to law. 
Teste: 
CECIL M. ROBERTSON, Clerk. 
The following is the Sergeant's return made on the fore-
going process : 
Executed in the City of Norfolk, Va., this 19th day of July, 
1938, by levying under this attachment on the fol-
page 6 ~ lowing property to-wit: 
One (1) Ford Tractor, 1938 Model. Motor #18-4273591. 
One (1) Naboris Trailer bearing Georgia Lie #114-F. 
Bond being given I took possession of the above described 
property and have stored same at Monticello Storage Garage. 
LEE F. LAWLER, 
City Sergeant, 
By HUGH L. BUTLER, JR., 
Deputy. 
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The following is the alias process issued o the first day of 
August, 1938 : 
Commonwealth of Virginia : 
To the Sergeant of the City of Norfolk, Gre ting: 
Whereas, W. J. Crosby & Company, Inc., pl intiff has here-
tofore on July 9, 1938, filed in the Clerk's O flee of our Cir-
cuit Court of the City of Norfolk, a petitio duly sworn to 
praying· for the issuance of an attachment a inst 0. L. Wil-
liams, principal defendant, upon the ground set out in said 
petition; Therefore, we command you as we . nve heretofore 
gone i1J the name oi. the Commonwealtli o rgima thatyou 
attach so much of the land, tenements, goods, chattels, money 
and effects of the said .defendant, not exe pt from execu-
tion, as will be sufficient' ot satisfy the dem d of. the plain-
tiff, as claimed in said petition, to-wit: for th~ sum of Eleven 
hundred twenty-five dollars and fifty cents $1,125.50) with 
legal interest thereon from the 14th ay of January, 
page 7 r 1936, till paid, arid the -costs; and if any tangible 
personal property be taken posse sion of by you 
hereunder, you shall safely keep the same in your possession 
to satisfy any judgment that may be recove d by the plain-
tiff in this proceeding. , ' 
We further command you as we have he etofore done in 
the name of the Commonw~alth of Virgmia t at you summon 
the sa,id defendant 0. L. Williams if he be f~fnd within your 
city, or in any city or county wherein you ipay have seized 
property under and by virtue hereof, to appear before our 
Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, at ~!the Courthouse 
thereof, on the 10th day of OctQber, 1938, nd· answer said 
petition or state the grounds of defense the to. . 
And then and there make known how yo shall have exe-
cuted this writ. · 
Witness, Cecil M. Robertson, Clerk of ou said Court, at 
his office, this 1st day of August, 1938, in t e 163rd year of 
the Commonwealth. 
Teste: 
CECIL lVL R!OBE TSON, Clerk. 
By W. R. HANCKEL, D. C. 
L.B. COX, p. q. 
.J 
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Executed in the City of Norfolk, Va., this the 1 day of Au-
gust, 1938, by serving a copy hereof on 0. L. Williams in per-
son. 
LEE. F. LAWLER, 
Sergi. City of Norfolk, Va. 
By HUGH L. BUTLER, JR., Deputy. 
page 8 r And at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court 
aforesaid on the 10th day of October, in the year, 
1938: 
Upon motion of Universal Credit Company, who appears 
to have delivered according· to law to the City Sergeant for 
the City of Norfolk, Virginia, an affidavit of ownership and 
title, and a denial of ownership on the part of 0. L. Williams 
against whose property the attachment was issued, and who 
complains that an attachment issued on the 19th day of July, 
1938, from the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of the City 
of Norfolk, Virginia, at the suit of W. J. Crosby & Company, 
Incorporated, against the following g·oods and chattels: 1937 
Nabor Trailer, F·ord, manufacturer's serial No. S2067D, li-
cense No. Ga. 114-F, and the said goods and chattels havin~ 
been attached by the City Sergeant of the City of Norfolk 
as the property of 0. L. Williams, which goods and chattels, 
as the said petitioner avers at the time of the is~uing of the 
attachment and long before were and ever since have been 
and are now the proper goods and chattels of it, the said Uni-
versal Credit Company and not the goods and chattels of the 
said 0. L. ,vmiams . 
.J Now therefore it is ordered that the said ,v. J. Crosby & 
1
1 
Company, Incorporated, and the said 0. L. Williams, as well 
as the said petitioner be summoned to appear in the above-
named court on the 1st day of November, 1938, to state and 
C'I Iitiga te their respective claims regarding the goods and chat-
""' tels as aforesaid, in order to arrive at a decision of their rights 
respecting the same. 
page 9 ~ The following is the acceptance of service on the 
copy of the fore going order: 
Service accepted. 
W. J. CROSBY & CO. INC., 
By L. B. COX, Atty. 
'\l 
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And on the same day, to-wit: In the Circ :t Court afore-
said, on the 10th day of October, in the year, 1938. 
Upon motion of C. I. T. Corporation, a c rporation duly 
organized and chartered under the laws of th State of West 
Virginia, who appears to have delivered acco ·ding· to law to 
the City Sergeant for the City of Norfolk, V rginia, an affi-
davit of ownership and title, and a denial o ownership on 
the part of 0. L. Williams against whose property the at-
tachment was issued, and who complains tha an attachment 
issued on the 19th day of July, 1938, from th Clerk's Office 
of the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, irginia, at the 
suit of W. J. Crosby & Company, Incorpora ed, against the 
following goods and chattels: A certain For , type of body, 
134" Truck CC, motor .No. 4273591, model 19 8, and the said 
goods and chattels having been attached by th City Sergeant 
of the City of :Norfolk as the property of . L. Williams, 
which goods and chattels, as the said petitio er avers at the 
time of the issuing of the attachment and long efore were and 
· ever since have been and are n w the proper 
page 10 ~ goods and chattels of it, the said ommercial In-
vestment Trust Corporation and n t the goods and 
chattels of the said 0. L. ,vmiams. 
Now therefore it is ordered that the said . J. Crosby & 
Company, Incorporated, and the said 0. L. v illiams, as well 
as the said petitioner be summoned to appe · in the above-
named court on the 1st day of November, 19 8, to state and 
litigate their respective claims regarding the ~oods and chat-
tels as aforesaid, in order to arrive at a decision of their 
rights respecting· the same .. 
The following is the acceptance of service on the copy of 
the foregoing order : 
Service accepted, 
W. J. CROSBY & 0., INC., 
By L. B. COX, Atty. 
The following are the applications for P ocesA of Inter-
pleader filed by leave of the fore going orders n the loth day 
of October, 1938 : · 
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APPLICATION FOR PROCESS OF INTERPLEADER. 
To the Honorable Aile~ R. Hanckel, Judge of said Court: 
The application of your petitioner, Universal Credit Com-
pany, respectfully shows that on the 19 day of July, 1938., 
W. J. Crosby & Company, Incorporated, petitioned the court 
to attach the estate, real and personal, of one 0. L. Williams:, 
alleging grounds of attachment, as set forth in said petition, 
and upon the prayer of said petition on the 19th. 
page 11 ~ day of July, 1938, an attachment was sued out of the 
Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, 
against the said 0. L. Williams, and afterwards on the 19th 
day of July, the said City Sergeant of the City of N orfolkt 
or his Deputy, attached certain goods and chattels, to-wit: 
\937 Nabor Traile1~,_Ford, manufacturer's __ serial N~!-S2067D, 
iicense No. Ya._ :U.4-.F.,, as anafor -tne· goods and chattels of 
said 0. L. Williams, when in fact the said goods and chattels 
as hereinbefore described at the time of the issuing of the said. 
attachment and lorig before were and ever since have been 
property of your petitioner and not the property of the said. 
0. L. Williams; and that the said W. J. Crosby & Company, 
Incorporated, an4 the said 0. L. Williams had not then nor 
at any time since have th~y had any right or interest therein, 
or any part thereof. 
Wherefore, your petitioner, having duly executed and de-
livered to the said City Sergeant for the City of Norfolk as 
aforesaid, an affidavit as to its aforesaid legal ownership, 
and a denial that the said 0. L. Williams had any ownership 
therein, your petitioner prays that the said W. J. Crosby & 
Company, Incorporated, and 0. L. Williams may be caused 
to appear before this court, as well as the petitioner, so that 
their resp~ctive claims regarding· the goods and chattels afore-
said may be litigated, in order to arrive at a decision of their 
rights respecting the same, and your petitioner prays that 
upon determination of the matter that the said attachment 
be dismissed and your petitioner recover of the petitioner for 
the attachment its reasonable costs in this behalf 
page 12 ~ expended, including a reasonable attorney fee for. 
its counsel. 
And your petitioner will ever pray, etc. 
UNIVERSAL CREDIT COMP A.NY 
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State of Virginia, 
City of Norfolk, to-wit: 
This day Vivian L. Page, Attorney for · niversal Credit 
Company, appeared in person before me, Vi let Crowder, a 
Notary Public in and for the City aforesaid in the State of 
Virginia, and made oath that the matters and things stated in 
the foregoing petition are true to the best o his knowledge 
and belief. 
Given under my hand this 15th day of Aug· 1st, 1938. 
· VIOLET C OWDER, 
otary Public. 
My commission expires December 17, 194r. 
APPLICATION FOR PROCESS OF INT RPLEADER. 
To the Honorable Allen R. Hanckel, J udg·e f said Court: 
The application of your petitioner, C. I. ~- Corporation, 
a corporation duly organized and charteredl;nder the laws 
of the State of West Virgfoia, respectfully* sows that on the 
19th· day of July, 1938, W. J. Crosby & Co pany, In_porpo-
rated, petitioned the court to attach the esta e, real and per-
sonal, of one 0. L. Williams, alleging groun of attachment, 
as set forth in said petition, and upon the P11ayer of said pe-
tition on the 19th day of July, 193r, an attachment 
page 13 } was sued out of the Circuit CourJ of the City of 
Norfolk, Virginia, against the sai~ 0. L. Williams, 
and afterwards on the 9th day of July, the sad City Serg·eant 
of the City of Norfolk, or his Deputy, attach d cert!l,in goods 
and chattels, to-wit: A certain Ford ty of bod 134" 
Tmck CC, motor No. .... 7~59 , mo e . . '.J as and for the 
good~ ana cnattels olsaid o~·L.-'Williains, hen in fact the 
said goods and chattels as hereinbefore, desc ibed at the time 
of the issuing of the said attachment and l ng before were 
and ever since have been property of you petitioner and 
not the property of the said 0. L. Williams; d that the said 
W. J. Crosby & Company, Incorporated, an the said O. L. 
Williams had not taken nor at any time sin e have they had 
any right or interest therein, or any part th reof. 
Wherefore, your petitioner, having duly ecuted and de-
livered to the said City Sergeant for the Ci of Norfolk, as 
aforesaid, an affidavit as to its aforesaid egal ownership, 
and a denial that the said 0. L. Williams ha any ownership 
therein, your petitioner prays that the said W. er. Crosby & 
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Company, Incorporated, and 0. L. Williams may be caused 
to appear before this court, as well as the petitioner, ~o that 
their respective claims regarding the goods and chattels afore-
said may be litigated, in order to arrive at a decision of their 
rights respecting the same, and your petitioner prays that 
upon determination of the matter that the said attaclup.ent 
be dismissed and your petitioner recover of the petitioner 
for the attachment its reasonable costs in this behalf expended, 
including a reasonable attorney fee for its counsel. 
page 14 ~ And your petitioner will ever pray, etc. 
C. I. T. CORPORATION 
By VIVIAN L. PAGE, Attorney. 
State of Virginia, 
City of Norfolk, to-wit: 
This day Vivian L. Page, Attorney for C. I. T., Corpora-
tion, appeared in person before me, Violet Crowder, a Notary 
Public in and for the City aforesaid, in the State of Virginia, 
and made oath that the matters and things stated in the fore-
going· petition are true to the best of his knowledge and be-
lief. 
Given under my hand this 15th day of August, 1938. 
VIOLE.T CROWDER, 
Notary Public. 
My commission expires December 17, 1941. 
And now, at this day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court afore-
said on the 23rd day of December, 1938, the dav and year 
first hereinabovc written: · 
On the 1st day of November, 1938, came the plaintiff by 
his attorney and the interpleaders, Commercial Investment 
Trust Corporation and Universal Credit Company, by their 
attorney, and waived trial by jury, introduced evidence for 
the plaintiff and for the interpleaders and submitted all ques-
tions of law and fact to the Court. 
Whereupon the Court, after mature considera-
page 15 ~ t.ion for reasons assigned in writing and made a 
pa.rt of this decree, held that the pla.intiff 's attach-
ment was duly issued and served on the defendant, 0. L. 
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Williams, a resident of Georgia, and was pr perly levied on 
July 19, 1938, on one :B,ord Truck, Motor o. 4273591, and 
one Nabor Ford Trailer, Serial No. S2067D, as the property 
of the said defendant, and that the plainti ! is entitled to 
judgment against the said defendant, 0. ·wmiams, for 
$1,125.50, with interest thereon from J anu$y 14, 1936, till 
paid, at the rate of six per centum per ce1 tum per annum 
and costs, and that the lien of the attachm nt has priority 
over the claims of the said interpleaders u der conditional 
sales contracts on the said truck and trailer executed in the 
State of Georgfa. 
And again on December 17., 1938, came t e interpleaders 
by attorney and moved the Court to set a · de its previous 
decision as contrary to the law and the evi ,ence, and asked 
leave to introduce a reciprocal agreement q.ated October 8, 
1938, between the States of Georgfa and Virg nia, executed by 
the Director of the Division of Motor Veh · les of Virginia 
and the Public Service Commissioner of the tate of Georgia, 
to which motion and request the plaintiff objected on the 
ground that the recip1·ocal agreement was e ecutecl after the 
attachment was levied and for that reason oulcl not in anv 
way affect the attachment lien, and also on the gTOUnd that 
the said agTeement, if proper evidence, sho d have been in-
troduced by the interpleaders at the trial i'n November 1st 
and could not be properly introduced at thi date, which ob-
jections the Court overruled and ermitted the in-
page 16 ~ troduction of said reciprocal agr ement, to which 
action of the Court the plaintiff uly excepted. 
And being of the opinion that the plaint ff is entitled to 
recover the amount claimed in the attachmen and that the at-
tachment is the first lien on the property lev ed on, the Court 
doth adjudge that the said W. J. Crosby a d Company, In-
corporated, do recover of 0. L. Williams th sum of ·Eleven 
Hundred Twenty-five & 50/100 ($1,125.50) ollars, with in-
terest thereon from January 14, 1936, till pa d, at the rate of 
six per centum per annum and its costs int is proceeding. 
And it appearing to the Court that each f the said inter-
pleaders did on or about August 15, 1938, t rn possession of 
the property claimed by it, after giving bo d for the forth-
coming of the same at such time and place a the Court might 
require, the said Commercial Investment T .ust Corporation 
is directed to deliver the said Ford Truck, in the condition 
in which the same was received by it in A ·ust, to the Ser-
geant of the City of Norfolk at his office o or before Janu-
ary 10, 1939, and the said Universal Credi Company is di-
rected to deliver the said trailer, in the co dition in which 
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the same was received by said interpleader in August, 'to 
the said Sergeant at his office on or before January 10, 1939. 
And it is further ordered that the Sergeant of the City· of 
Norfolk do advertise and sell the said Ford Truck and Nabor 
Trailer under the said attachment as provided by law and 
apply the proceeds of sale to the payment of said 
page 16-a ~ judgment and report to the Court as to the bal-
ance, if any, left in his hands. 
And thereupon said interpleaders, Commercial Investment 
Trust Corporation and ;universal Credit Company, by their 
attorney, duly excepted. 
And thereupon said interpleaders having signified their in-
tention of applying to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia for a writ of error and supersedeas to the foregoing 
judgment, it is ordered that execution upon the foregoing 
judgment be suspended for the period of sixty ( 60) days from 
the end of this term of the Court upon said interpleaders, or 
someone for them, entering into and acknowledging a proper 
suspending bond before the Clerk of this Court in the penalty 
of $1,250.00, with surety to be approved by said Clerk, and 
with condition according to law. 
The following is the Judge's opinion filed herein and 
incorporated in the record by the foregoing order: 
November 9, 1938. 
Mr. L.B. Cox 
Mr. Vivian L. Page 
Gentlemen :-
~e: W. J. Crosby & Co., v. 0. L. W'illiams, C. I. 
T. Corporation and ·Universal Credit Co. 
interveners. 
I think the case of C. I. T. Corp. v. Guy, decided by the 
Court of Appeals, March 10, 1938, has settled the question 
that a conditional sales contract properly recorded 
page 17 ~ under the laws of another state is good in Virginia, 
but that case clearly indicates that if the registra-
tion of a foreig·n motor vehicle is required under the Motor 
Vehicle Code of Virginia, then the liens on such vehicle are 
required to be recorded in Virginia. See also section 17 of 
the M V Code. I think the evidence shows that the'defendant 
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0. L. Williams had regularly operated his otor vehicle· in 
Virginia as defined by that code (Section 23 , that is by op-
erating more than four times in the month o l\fay, 1938, for 
purp·oses other than purposes of pleasure, a d by failing to 
make temporary registration at the first av ilable registra-
tion point after entering· this state on his . "rd trip in the 
month of July, 1938. 
My conclus.ion therefore is that the lien o the attachment 
has priority over the liens of the conditiona sales contracts 
held by the interveners. 
Yours very truly, 
R. B. SPINDLE 
R. B. pindle. 
page 18 ~ Virginia : 
In the Circuit Court of the City of orfolk. 
W. J. Crosby & Company, Incorporated, 
v. 
0. L. Williams, and C. I. T. Corporation and niversal Credit 
Company, interpleaders. ~ 
The f ollowin$' are the facts as proved by t e evidence upon 
the. trial of tlns case which facts are f oun, as a result of 
the evidence in this case and the following e · hibits, the origi-
nals of which counsel for the plaintiff and the defendant have 
stipulated may be transmitted to the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia and all orders and excep#ons and all in-
cidents of the trial are hereinafter set for h, including the 
objections and exceptions thereto in the Cir nit Court of the 
City of Norfolk, Virginia, before the Hono able Richard B. 
Spindle, Judge of the Corporation Court of he City of Nor-
folk, Virginia, sitting for and in the place nd stead and at 
the request of the Honorable Allan R. Hane el, Judge of the 
Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Virgi. ia, as provided 
for by law, together with the motions and bjections on the 
part of the respective parties and the action of the court in 
~·espect thereto and the exceptions of the· r spective parties 
as hereinafter shown. 
page 19 ~ The following facts on behalf of the plaintiff and 
the defendants, respectively, as hereinafter de-
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noted, are all of the facts that were introduced on the trial of 
this cause. 
On June 27th, 1938, Strickland Motor Company of Cordele, 
Georgia. sold to 0. L. ·wiilliams a certain motor vehicle de-
scribed as a Ford 134" Truck C. C. Motor No. 4273591-1938 
model. To secure an unpaid balance of the purchase price, 
title was reserved and the contract of reservation of title was 
on the 28th day of June, 1938, for value, legally assigned to 
the C. I. T. Corporation and was determined by the Court to 
be dulv recorded in accordance with the laws of Georgia, and 
on the 9th day of July, 1938, there was and still is due the 
C. I. T. Corporation a balance on the purchase price in the 
sum of $839.40. 
On August 23rd, 1987, Strickland Motor Company of Cor-
dele, Georgia, sold to C. E. McElmurray of Rebecca, Georgia, 
a certain truck and motor vehicle tra.iler described as ''Nabor 
Trailer", serial No. S2067D, and to secure the unpaid balance 
of the purchase price, title was reserved and for value re-
ceived the said title was assigned to the Universal Credit 
Company. The contract of reservation of title was duly and 
properly recorded in the State of and in accordance with .the 
laws of, Georg-ia, and on the 1st d~y of February, 1938, the 
said C. E. :McElmurray transferred for value and legally his 
equity in said trailer to the said 0. L. Williams of Cordele, 
Georgia, subject to the reserved title contract aforesaid, and 
on the 9th day of July, 1938, there was and still is due the 
Universal Credit Company a balance on the pur-
page 20 ~ chase price in the sum of $47 4.98. 
These reservations of title and liens were duly, 
legally and properly recorded in the State of Georgia and in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Georgia were valid 
prior liens as against subsequent purchasers and creditors of 
0. L. Williams. The said conditional sales contracts and 
reservations of title were not recorded in the State of Vir-
ginia on or before July 9th, 1938, nor have they ever been re-
corded in Virginia. 
Prior to July 9th, 1938, 0. L. Williams was and still is in-
debted to W. J. Crosby & Company, Incorporated, a corpora-
tion organized under the laws of the State of Virginia, with 
principal offices in the City of Norfolk, Virginia, in the sum 
of $1,1250.00, with interest thereon from January 14th, 1936. 
In May, 1938, 0. L. Williams operated certain trucks and· 
trailers (not identified as those above described) from Georgia 
to Norfolk, Virginia, more than 4 times, to-wit: 5 times for 
purposes other than pleasure, to-wit: to transport from Nor-
folk, Virginia, to Cordele, Georgia, seafood products pur-
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chased in the City of Norfolk Virginia, by hi ; the said 0. L. 
Williams did not make temporary registrar n at the first 
available registration point after entering t is state at any 
time. 
On July 9, 1938, W. J. Crosby & Compan , Incorporated, 
of Norfolk, Virginia, sued out an attachm nt against the 
above described vehicles, which attachment f~vas duly levied 
upon the hereinbefore described vehicle an trailer by the 
Citv Sergeant of the City of Norfolk . 
., The following agreement betwee:µ the Director of 
page 21 ~ the Division of Motor Vehicles of the State of Vir-
ginia, and the Chairman of the Public Servic.e 
Commission and Revenue Commissioner f the State of 
Georgia, was introduced in evidence. 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGI IA 
OFFICE OF THE 
DIVISION OF ~LOTOR VEHIC ES. 
I, M. S. Battle, Director, Division of Mo· or Vehicles, do 
hereby certify, that the attached is a true cof of the recipro-
cal agreement now existing between the State of Virg·inia and 
Georgfa. 
The original Reciprocal Agreement is on Ie and of record 
in this office. 
Given under my hand and under the seal of the Division 
of Motor Vehicles, at Richmond, this thirte nth day of De-
cember in the year of our Lord, one thousa d nine hundred 
and thirty-eight and i.n the one hundred and sixty-third year 
of the Commonwealth. 
Seal 
This memorandum agreement made .and ntered into he-
tween the parties hereinafter named, and ins far as it applies 
to the State of Georgia, the Dep rtment of Reve-
page 22 ~ nue of the State of Georgia and t Georgia Public 
Service Commission are anthori ed to enter in.to 
this agreement in pursuance of an Act pa sed by the Gen-
eral Assembly of Georgia entitled "Be it e acted an Act to 
provide for Reciprocal Agreements with ot er States as to 
privileges of opera ting Motor Vehicles ove the Highways 
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of this State, and to provide the Powers and Duties of State 
Agencies or Departments in reference to said Reciprocal 
Agreements, to provide an Effective date for this Act, and 
for other purposes''. 
Now in pursuance o·f said Act this Agreement is made and 
entered into between the State Revenue Commission of the 
State of Georgia and the Director of the Division of Motor 
Vehicles of the Commonweal th of Virginia, and also between 
the Public Service Commission of the State of Georgia and 
the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles of the Com-
monwealth of Virginia. 
This Agreement is to be construed as two separate ag1·ee-
ments between the·parties above ~tated, so as to comply with 
the above State Act of the Georgia General Assembly. · 
WITNESSETH: That motor vehicles owned and operated 
by any person or persons, firm or corporation resident of the 
State of Virginia duly licensed and properly registered by 
the State of Virginia are hereby authorized to operate and 
to be operated in the State of Georgia Without securing mo-
tor vehicle license registration plates and licenses or permits 
from the State of Georgia in accordance with the following· 
provisions : 
ARTICLE I. 
PRIVATE PASSENGER VEHICLES AND PRIVATE 
TRUCKS AlND TRAILERS NOT OPERATED FOR 
HIRE OR COMPENSATION. 
page 23 ~ The provisions of this Article apply to only the 
persons described in the heading. · 
PARAGRAPH ONE. That any passenger motor vehicle 
not operated for compensation or employed in contract haul-
ing shall be allowed to operate in the State of Georgia for a 
period of thirty days provided that the establishment of a 
domicile or place of temporary abode and engagement in a 
g·ainful occupation within the State of Georgia shall be deemed 
the establishment of :i residence in the State of Georgia for 
the purpose of motor vehicle registration, provided further 
that should the owner of any such passenger motor vehicle 
operate such vehicle in the State of Georgia after the ex-
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piration of such thirty-day period he or sh shall obtain a 
Georgia registration and license paying· there or the same fee 
which he or she would have paid had he or she obtained a 
registration and license at the time he first b gan to operate 
said vehicle in the State of Georgia. The re iproca} conces-
sions provided in this paragraph shall be exte ded only in the 
event that the owner of any such motor vehi le shall comply 
with all the valid laws of the State of Georgia provided, how-
ever, any passenger motor vehicle owned an operated by a 
resident. of the State of Virginia the owner of which works 
in and makes daily trips into the State of eorgia shall be 
allowed to operate in the State of Georgia ithout Georgia 
license plates, provided said vehicle is licens~cl by the owner 
in the State of Virginia. .I 
PARAGRAPH TWO. It is further provided that citizens, 
firms or corporations of the State pf Virginia hav7" 
page 24 ~ ing a place of business near the tate boundary 
line of Georgia, who operate wreck rs duly licensed 
under the State of Virginia shall be permitt d to cross over 
the line of Georgia and into the State of G orgia on emer-
gency trips for the purpose of rendering se ice in the case 
of wrecks or otherwise disabled motor vehic es. 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCJS 
PARAGRAPH THREE. TRUCKS, truck! tractors, trail-
ers and semi-trailers operated for the sole nurpose of mar-
keting seasonable agricultural products rais~d by the owner 
or operator of such vehicles, or trucks, truck actors, trailers 
or semi-trailers operated for the sole purpos of purchasing 
seasonable agricultural products from the -rower or pro-
ducer of same, may make ten trips per cale dar month into 
the State of Georgia, provided said vehicles re duly licensed 
in the State of Virginia. 
This agreement does not permit residents of either State 
to go into t.he other State to buy up agric ltural or farm 
products or other foods, wares or merchan ise and peddle 
or offer the same for sale in said State. 
SCHOOLS, COLLEGES, RELIGIOUS OR HARITABLE 
ORGANLZATIONS 
P AHAGRAPH FOUR. Motor Vehicles ow ed or chartered 
. by schools or colleges, religious or charitabl organizations, 
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when used to convey their students, or other scholastic and 
religions or charitable organizations conveying members of 
said organizations on temporary trips to either State shall 
not be required to qualify, register, or procure Ii-
page 25 ~ cense plates in either State, provided however, that 
said motor vehicles so used shall be duly licensed 
as required by law in the State of the residence of said 
schools, colleges, religious or charitable organizations. 
MOTOR VEHICLES OPERAT.ED BY ANY PERSON, 
InRM ASSOCIATION, PARTNERSHIP OR CORPORA-
TlON FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF EXHIBI-
TIONS OR OTHER FORMS OR ENTERTAINMEN'l~ 
FOR ·wHICH .ADMISSION FEES ARE CHARGED. 
The provisions of this agreement shall not be construed in 
any case to apply to motor vehicles used by any person, firm, 
association, partnership or corporation which are used in thE:! 
transportation of persons or property where such person, 
firm, association, partnership or corporation transports said 
persons or property for the purpose of giving performances:, 
exhibitions or other forms of entertainment for which enter-· 
tairunent admission fees are charged. 
PRIVATE TR.UCKS, TRAILERS AND SEMI-TRAILERS 
That any truck, tractor, trailer and semi-trailer or com-· 
bi.nation of truck and trailer operated by the owner or duly 
authorized agent thereof for the purpose of transferring: 
goods, wares, merchandise or any other commodity the actual 
property of the owner of said motor yehicle shall be allowed 
to be operated in both states where said truck or combina-· 
tin of truck and trailer or semi-trailer has been properly }i •. 
censed in either State for a period covered by the license is-
sued by such State, provided, however, that this paragraph 
shall not be construed to allow the owner of a motor vehicle 
who maintains a place of business in both States, to operate 
such vehicle in the State in which such business is 
page 26 ~ maintained and in connection with or incident to 
such business without obtaining license and pay-
ing the fees prescribed for such a motor vehicle in the State 
in which the business is maintained and the Motor Vehicle is 
operated. 
Provided further: That the privileges being· granted to 
private operations of motor vehicle equipment shall not ex-
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tend where such vehicles are being operated or hire, or en-
gaged in co:µtract hauling. 
ARTICLE II. 
WHEN OPERATED FOR HIRE 0~ COM ENSATION 
PARAGRAPH ONE. Motor vehicles ownei and operated 
by any person or persons, firm or corporation resident of the 
State of Virginia operating motor vehicles a a carrier for 
hire under the regulatory and license laws f the State of 
Virginia may make occasional trips into, thr ugh or across 
the State of Georgia without paying regulatL or registra-
tion fees provided that the term "occasional trips" as used 
herein means :, 
a. Not more than one trip per week, per p~ son, company, 
firm or corporation to pick up, load or unload packages, 
freig·ht or merchandise within the State. 
b. Not more than one trip per vehicle per week when no 
packages, freight or merchandise is picked uj, loaded or un-
loaded within the State. 
c. Provided further, that the vehicle or yeh cles are legally 
qualified under the "for hire carrier" laws df said resident 
. state, and that the carrier is legallf.1 qualified with 
page 27 ~ the Interstate Commerce Commissi n, as provided 
by the Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935, to op-
erate in interstate commerce between the tw~ states. 
d. Provided further that the load being tr nsported shall 
have originated in or be destined to the State of residence in 
which the carrier is qualified. 
ARTICLE IIL 
GENERAL 
PARAGRAPH ONE. The privileges g-ran ed herein shall 
not be construed to !:tpply to any vehicle w "ch is operated 
on regular route or schedule, nor shall the pri visions of this 
agreement apply to vehicle.s carrying extr fuel tanks or 
supply attached or unattached. 
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P .AR.A.GR.A.PH TvVO. All of the rights, privileges and im-
munities extended by the State of Georgia to persons, firms 
or corporations of the State of Virginia in pursuance of this 
· agreement shall in like manner be extended to persons, firms 
or corporations of the State of Georgia by the State of Vir-
ginia. It being the purpose of this agreement that persons, 
firms or corporations of the two States parties to this agree-
ment be granted the same rights, privileges, and immunities 
in the two States which are parties hereto. 
P AR,.A.GRAPH THREE. This agreement may be cancelled 
by either State on ten days written notice, unl~ss such agree-
ment is revoked by Statute of either State. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, THE OFFICIAL8 
page 28 ~ of the State of Georgia and officials of the State 
of Virginia hav:e sig·ned this agreement in their 
official capacity. 
THIS THE 8TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 1938. 
W. R. McDONALD (Signed) 
W. R. McDONALD, 
Chairman of the Public Service Commission 
of the State of Georgia. 
M. S. BATTLE (Signed) 
l\f. S. B.A. TTLE, Director 
of the Division of M:otor Vehicles, 
Commonwea] th of Virg·inia. 
APPROVED--
T. GRADY HEAD (Signed) 
T. GRADY HEAD, 
Revenue Commissioner of the State of 
Georgia. 
JAMES H. PRICE (Signed) 
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The Code of Georgia proyides as follows : 
''The registration and recordation of cond tional bills of 
sale shall be governed in all respects by the l~ws relating to 
the registration of mortgages on personal prperty except 
that they must be recorded within 30 days fro their date." 
The laws relating to the registration of mor[ gages on per-
sonal property are as follows: 
'' Mortgages on realty shall be recorded in th} county where 
the land lies; on personalty, in the county w ere the mort-
gagor resided at the time of the execution, i a resident of 
this state, and if a non-resident, ~·n the county 
page 29 ~ where the mortgaged property is. If a mortgage 
. shall be executed upon personalty ot within the 
limits of this State, and such property shall afterwards be 
brought within the state, the mortgage shall g~ recorded ac-
cording to the above rules within 6 months atiter such prop-
erty is so broug·ht in. All chattel mortgage~ of stocks of 
goods, wares and merchandise, or other pers nal property, 
shall be recorded, in case the same is upon pro: erty or goods 
located in some other county than that of thle mortgagor's 
residence, in the county where said personal property is lo-
cated at the time of the execution of said mortgage, in addi-
tion to the record of said mortgage in the 1county of the 
mortgagor's residence where a mortgage eithrr upon realty 
or personalty is executed to secure the paYnp.ent of money 
or other thing of value, and the same is not rlorded as pro-
vided by law, but such mortg·age is renewed r re-executed, 
in every case of renewal or re-execution of a ortgage which 
has not been recorded, such mortgage shall operate as a lien 
upon the property of the mortgagor only as ag inst the mort-
gagor himself and those having actual notice of such mort-
gage except from the date of record of such ortgage. '' 
0. K. L. B. COX. 
page 30 ~ I, Richard B. Spindle, Judge of t e Corporation 
· Court of the City of Norfolk, Virgi ia, and sitting· 
for and in the place and stead and at the requ st of the Hon-
orable Allan R. Haneke}, Judge of the Circui Court of the 
City of Norfolk, Virginia, who presided over the fore going 
trial of W. J. Crosby & Company, Incorporate , v. 0. L. Wil-
liams, ancl C. I. T. Corporation and Univers l Credit Com-
40 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
pany, interpleaders, in the Circuit Court of the City of Nor-
folk, Virginia, on the 1st day of November, 1938, do hereby 
certify that the foregoing is a true and correct statement of 
the facts and all the facts produced at this trial as a result" 
of the evidence produced by all parties concerned and the 
foreg·oing includes all other incidents of the said trial includ-
ing the judgment of this court entered at the conclusion of 
the said trial with the exceptions and objections of the rEi-
spective parties as therein set out . 
.And I do hereby further certify that the plaintiffs had rea.-
sonable notice in writing, given by the interpleaders, C. I. T. 
Corporation and Universal Credit Company, of the time and 
place when said certificate of facts and incidents of the trial, 
together with the objections and exceptions and all incidents 
of the trial, would be tendered and presented to ·the under-
signed for signature and authentication. 
Given under my hand this 14th day of January, 1939, within 
60 days after the entry of the final judgment in said case. 
RICH.ARD B. SPINDLE, 
Judge of the Corporation Court of the City of 
Norfolk, Virginia, sitting for and in the 
place and stead and at the request of the 
Honorable .Allan R.. Hanckel, Judge of the 
Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, Vir-
ginia, in compliance with the law in such case 
made and provided. 
page 31 ~ I, Cecil M. Robertson, Clerk of the Circuit Court 
of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, do certify that 
the foregoing Statement of the F·acts in the case of W. J. 
Crosby & Company, Incorporated, v. 0. L. Williams, and C. 
I. T. Corporation and Universal Credit Company, interplead-
ers, herein referred to, which has been duly authenticated 
by the trial judge, was filec1, and lodged with me as Clerk o-f 
said Court on the 14th day of January, 1938. . 
CECIL M. ROBERTSON, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of the City of 
Norfolk, Virginia. 
The following is the stipulation of counsel filed herein on 
the 14th day of January, 1939: 
It is hereby stipula.ted by and between counsel that th,3 
original contracts of conditional bill of sale, the assignment:3 
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and certificates of recordation hereto and me o. of dates, at-
tached which were introduced in evidence ma be transmitted 
to the Supreme Court of Appeals along wit the record. 
Giv~n under our hands this 14th day of J nuary, 1939. 
W. J. CROSBY & COMP ANY, IN ORPORATED. 
By L. B. COX, Counsel. . 
C. I. T. CORPORATION AND UNIVERSAL 
CREDIT COMP ANY. 
By PAGE, PAGE & PAGE, Counsel. 
page 32 ~ The following is the notice o appeal, filed 
herein: 
You are hereby notified that on January 14 h, 1939, the un-
dersigned shall present to the Judge of the ab ve-named court 
for his certification the facts and evidence in he above-styled 
case, and you are further notified that on Jhe 17th day of 
. January, 1939, the undersigned will request 110 Clerk of the 
Court to make up the record in the above-st ed case for the 
purpose of applying to the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia, for a writ of error and supersedeas 
C. I. T. CORPORATI N 
and 
UNIVERSAL CREDI COMP .A:NY 
By PAGE, PAGE & P AG , Counsel. 
Service accepted this 14 day of January, 1939. 
W. J. CROSBY & COMP ANY, INC 
By L. B. COX, Counsel. 
pag·e 33 ~ Virginia: 
In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Cour of the Citv of 
Norfolk, on the 27th clay of January, in the ear, 1939. " 
I, Cecil M. Robertson, Clerk of the Circ it Court of the 
City of Norfolk, do certify that the foregoin is a true tran-
script of the record in the suit of W. J. Oro by & Company, 
Incorporated, plaintiff, against 0. L. Willi ms, defendant, 
lately pending in said court. 
I further certify that the same was not m de up and com-
pleted and delivered until the plaintiff had re eived due notice 
thereof, and of the intention of the interp eaders C. I. T. 
42 Supreme Court o~ Appeals of Virginia. 
Corporation and Universal Credit Company to apply to the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for a writ of error 
and supersedeas to the judgment therein. 
Teste: 
CECIL M. ROBERTSON, Clerk. 
By MARGUERITE R. GRONER, D. C. 
Fee for Transcript $28.50 . 
.A. Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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